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BOOK REVIEWS
LORD'S JUSTICE, by Sheldon Engelmayer and Robert
Wagman. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday,

1985. Pp. 312. $17.95.
Jeff Sovern*

Lord's Justice provides an enthralling account of several of the Dalkon
Shield cases and the judge who presided over them-Miles W. Lord. Judge
Lord is a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota. Throughout the book, authors Sheldon Engelmayer
and Robert Wagman raise troubling questions for lawyers, judges, and
everyone else concerned with fairness and efficiency in complex civil litigation. The book focuses on three principal topics: (1) A. H. Robins's marketing of the Dalkon Shield; (2) the defense and discovery abuses of the
Robins attorneys in the ensuing products liability cases; and (3) Judge Lord's
scolding of three Robins officials during a settlement hearing.
In 1970, A. H. Robins purchased the rights to the Dalkon Shield, an
intra-uterine birth control device (IUD). At that time, evidence suggested
that the Dalkon Shield was more effective than other IUDs in that it had a
1.1 percent pregnancy rate compared to 3.0 percent rates for other IUDs.
These conclusions, however, were based on a study conducted by Dr. Hugh
J. Davis, a developer of the Dalkon Shield and part owner of the company
that sold the Dalkon Shield to Robins.' As might be expected from one who
had such a conflict of interests, Dr. Davis employed questionable research
methods. Later experience showed that the Dalkon Shield had a pregnancy
rate as high as 5.0 percent. Although it knew of the flaws in Dr. Davis's
study before it purchased the manufacturing rights, Robins nevertheless relied
heavily on the Davis study in promoting the Dalkon Shield.
The ineffectiveness of the Dalkon Shield as a contraceptive, however, was
not the basis for the later products liability suits. The plaintiffs sued Robins
because of injuries caused by a string attached to the Dalkon Shield. This
string was designed to allow women and their physicians to determine whether
the device was properly inserted. The string was composed of many smaller
strings, or filaments. Multifilamented strings are capable of transporting
bacteria to the normally bacteria-free uterus through a process called "wick-

* Jeff Sovern, A.B., J.D., Columbia University. Mr. Sovern is an Associate Professor of
Law at St. John's University.
1. Dr. Davis later testified that he received more than $500,000 from the sale of the Dalkon
Shield to Robins.
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ing." These bacteria can cause serious infections, which can result in sterility
and even death. For this reason, most IUD manufacturers used monofilament
strings, which apparently do not wick bacteria. Within two weeks of the
purchase of the Dalkon Shield rights, Robins targeted the string for special
attention because of the possibility of wicking. Robins decided to encase
most of the string in a nylon sheath. The sheaths, however, did not solve
the problem. In time, many of the sheaths ruptured and exposed the filaments
to harmful bacteria. Even when the sheaths did not rupture, exposed portions
of the strings sometimes became contaminated.
In the years that followed, evidence of the wicking problem became nearly
incontrovertible. Government agencies and the Planned Parenthood Association warned that the Dalkon Shield was unsafe. Nevertheless, Robins did
not replace the string with a monofilament, though it determined that using
new material for the string would cost only 6.1 cents per Shield. Instead,
Robins persistently denied that the Dalkon Shield was in any way defective.
Ultimately, thousands of users of the Dalkon Shield claimed that they
suffered infection. Many of these women became sterile; some died.
Although Robins's marketing of the Dalkon Shield is a notable case study
in products liability history, litigators should be especially interested in the
authors' portrayal of Robins's defense tactics in the Dalkon Shield products
liability cases. According to the authors, counsel for Robins went to extraordinary lengths to deter the filing of suits and to retard the progress of filed
cases. It is not unusual, of course, for defendants with large exposure to
resort to delaying tactics in order to wear down plaintiffs and thereby produce
lower settlements. At the very least, delaying tactics allow defendants the
current use of money ultimately awarded to plaintiffs upon resolution of
their claims. Engelmayer and Wagman, though, find Robins's behavior
especially egregious.
The authors describe a series of unfortunate practices on the part of
Robins's lawyers, including some designed to induce plaintiffs and their
lawyers to drop their cases, or at least to settle on favorable terms. Robins's
attorneys repeatedly questioned plaintiffs about intimate activities-activities
that the authors argue were not relevant to the lawsuits. Some women chose
not to sue rather than to endure such interrogation. Additionally, the authors
report that Robins's counsel attempted to intimidate one of Judge Lord's
law clerks. The attorneys allegedly warned the law clerk against ever accepting
a job with any law firm that had a lawsuit pending against Robins. Such
conduct is obviously inconsistent with a lawyer's obligations as an officer
of the court. 2
Engelmayer and Wagman also show that Robins repeatedly challenged
court orders and failed to comply with court-set deadlines. After losing a
motion in a case before one judge, Robins frequently would make the same

2.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 7-110 (1985).
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motion in other cases before other judges. The authors report that in one
case Robins objected, generally unsuccessfully, to the introduction into
evidence of nearly 570 documents. Adjudication of these objections consumed a great deal of time. One hearing, covering only eight documents,
lasted three days. Nevertheless, Robins made the same objections in the very
next trial, in the same jurisdiction, and obtained another lengthy hearing.
The doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis should have precluded this
waste of judicial resources. Unfortunately, in the Dalkon Shield cases they
did not.
Another favorite Robins defense tactic was heavy reliance on out-of-state
lawyers who would appear for one hearing and then never reappear. This
permitted the lawyer to make representations based on information available
to him but which may not have been the best information available to
Robins. Judge Lord eventually tired of this device. He asked that all of the
Robins lawyers appearing in his courtroom take an oath to abide by the
rules of the court and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota
State Board on Ethical Practices. After studying the proposal, the Robins
attorneys from outside Minnesota refused to sign the oath. Judge Lord then
excused the non-Minnesota lawyers from the case. Robins's Minnesota counsel, however, refused to proceed without the other lawyers. Eventually, the
out-of-state counsel agreed to sign the oath. This, however, did not completely solve the problem.
Robins also used irregular tactics when it negotiated some of its settlements. For example, Robins sometimes sought to include in settlement
agreements a pledge by the plaintiff's lawyer that the lawyer would not
accept any future Dalkon Shield cases. In at least one negotiation, Robins's
attorneys reportedly claimed that this term was non-negotiable and a "deal
breaker." 3 This practice forced new plaintiffs to seek attorneys who were
not experienced with Dalkon Shield litigation or Robins's defense practices.
Thus, Robins could count on additional delays while new lawyers took
time to familiarize themselves with the complicated litigation. Robins used
this tactic despite the fact that it clearly violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states, "[I1n connection with the settlement of a
shall not enter into any agreement that restricts
controversy or suit, a lawyer
'4
his right to practice law."
Some of the worst abuses occurred in Robins's discovery conduct. The
authors report that Robins concealed and destroyed documents and improperly invoked the attorney/client privilege and work product doctrines. Furthermore, Robins's deposition witnesses were remarkable in their inability
to remember details. The book includes excerpts from transcripts of depositions of Robins officials in which they repeatedly cannot recall ever learning

3. S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE 86 (1985).
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (1985).
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significant facts. One memorable example concerns a Robins official whose
wife used the Dalkon Shield for several years. Two months after her Dalkon
Shield was removed, she underwent a hysterectomy. The official testified
that he did not know of any problems his wife had had with the Dalkon
Shield and that he could not recall whether he had asked his wife if the
hysterectomy was related to the Dalkon Shield or if she had the type of
infection which the Dalkon Shield commonly caused.
How should the courts deal with these abuses? One response to problems
of procedure is to adopt new procedural rules. To this end, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended three times in the 1980's alone.'
Moreover, district courts have engaged in a great deal of procedural rulemaking. Commentators have estimated that there are nearly three thousand
local rules 6 written in about one-and-a-half-million words. 7 Furthermore,
many judges have announced standing or general orders designed to function
as their own rules of civil procedure.' In addition, many procedural rules
are created by case law.
New rules alone will not solve the problem without the appropriate use
of judicial sanctions. In the Dalkon Shield cases, Robins's conduct frequently
violated existing ethical and procedural rules. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize judges to impose sanctions on attorneys who disobey
certain rules. 9 Nevertheless, Judge Lord did not specifically sanction any of
the Robins's attorneys.' 0 If he had, he might have saved a great deal of

5. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1980, 1983, and again in 1985.
6. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and
District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537, 538 (1985) (Rule
83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which gives district courts the authority to promulgate
local practice rules "not inconsistent" with the federal rules, has created a threat to the integrity
and the uniformity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
7. Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information? 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 213, 261 (1981) (while the creation of local rules by district courts
has led to some abuses, the sum total of errors is slight and their effects insignificant in relation
to the advantages the local rules offer).
8. Kahn, Local Pretrial Rules in Federal Courts, 6 LITIGATION 14 (1980) (there is no
guarantee that local rules will be followed in a particular jurisdiction because judges can ignore
or supplement them with their own standing orders; therefore, a case in federal district court
may be governed by a unique set of local rules and standing orders, in addition to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. In one case, Robins failed to provide complete answers to
interrogatories in violation of three successive court orders. The judge (not Judge Lord) struck
Robins's defense and entered a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The book does not suggest,
however, that this sanction had any impact upon Robins's conduct before other judges, including
Judge Lord.
10. The magistrate in the case later held a hearing to determine whether sanctions should
be imposed for destruction of documents in violation of the settlement agreement.
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subsequent pain and effort." Judge Lord, however, is not unique among
2
federal judges in his reluctance to impose sanctions on attorneys.
If rules alone are insufficient to ensure that cases are properly resolved,
what will accomplish that end? The authors of Lord's Justice clearly approve
of the method chosen by Judge Lord. An activist judge, 3 Judge Lord closely
supervised his cases, even flying from Minnesota to Virginia to preside over
depositions. His efforts apparently worked. Robins eventually chose to settle
the cases rather than continue the discovery process under Judge Lord. The
clear implication is that Robins preferred to take its chances with other
judges.
The authors laud Judge Lord's behavior and appear to believe that judges
should play a stronger supervisory role in the discovery process. But this
approach has costs of its own. First, it takes a great deal of time for judges
to umpire discovery. The book quotes one plaintiff's attorney as saying that
Judge Lord put in eighteen to twenty hours a day on the Dalkon Shield
cases. At the same time, Judge Lord had to manage his other cases and his
administrative responsibilities as Chief Judge. The drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure recognized this problem and permitted judges to
establish schedules through local rules. 4 Additionally, there is statutory
authority for judges to delegate the supervision of discovery to magistrates.' 5
Even so, day-to-day supervision of discovery in every case by a judge or
magistrate would be very expensive. Other solutions to discovery abuse
should be utilized when available.

11. Ironically, Judge Lord later defended his conduct by arguing that his reprimand of
Robins was intended as a sanction for discovery abuse. The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that if Judge Lord had sought to punish Robins for abusive litigation practices, he
should have used the judicial procedures established for that purpose. Gardiner v. A. H. Robins
Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1193 (8th Cir. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposalfor More Effective Discovery Through Local
Rules, 30 VILL. L. REv. 767, 795 (1985) ("It is unlikely that courts will impose sanctions for
discovery abuse under the new rules with any greater enthusiasm than they did prior to the
1983 amendments"). See generally Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under
the New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 680
(1983) (judges do not sanction because federal rule enforcement provisions are inadequate);
Weinstein, Reflections on 1983 Amendments to U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
14, 1983, at 1 (federal judge expresses reluctance to impose sanctions).
13. An activist judge is a judge less concerned with the application of the right rules than
with reaching a result consistent with his or her sense of justice.
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(b) ("Except in categories of actions exempted by district court rule
as inappropriate, the judge, or a magistrate when authorized by district court rule, shall ...
enter a scheduling order .... "). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) ("the court shall enter an
order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule
for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any; and determining such other matters ....
as are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the action"); FED. R. Civ. P. 83
(permitting judges to make local rules not inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1968).
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Second, activist judges sometimes step beyond appropriate limits. Judge
Lord risked just that when he scolded Robins in his speech at the settlement
hearing. Hence, an activist judiciary may not be the solution. Indeed, if the
rules intended to solve the problems are ignored by activist judges, then
these judges are contributing to the problem rather than curing it.
The problem of discovery abuse may not be susceptible to an easy solution.
As long as the choice is between the use of unattractive procedural rules
providing for the imposition of sanctions and the enormous amount of time
required for the proper supervision of discovery, the possibility remains that
some litigators will abuse the discovery process. It is frustrating to know
that rules exist which may help prevent discovery abuse, but that judges
ignore them. The solution simply may be to force judges to obey the rules,
but who will bell that cat?
The third focus of the book is Judge Lord's speech during the settlement
hearing. Judge Lord apparently directed his remarks to three Robins officers
who were present at the hearing. He criticized their behavior in connection
with the Dalkon Shield and urged them to make amends for their actions.
Judge Lord also castigated the officers for, among other things, engaging
in "corporate irresponsibility at its meanest,"1 6 and for proving that "it
pays to delay compensating victims, and to intimidate, harass and shame
your victims."' 7 In response, Robins complained to the Judicial Council of
the Eighth Circuit under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.18
The Eighth Circuit expunged Judge Lord's remarks from the record of the
settlement hearing and criticized his conduct. In keeping with the traditional
reluctance of courts to sanction judges, the court of appeals imposed no
other penalties.
Judge Lord's comments go to the heart of a judge's obligation to litigants
in cases other than those directly before him. Judge Lord, while on the
bench and after his own cases had terminated through settlement, called
upon Robins to settle, or at least view more favorably, the claims of other
Dalkon Shield plaintiffs. This seems improper. Judges, when on the bench,
may act only in the context of specific cases. For example, federal judges
may not render advisory opinions.' 9 The Constitution limits the role of
federal judges to deciding cases or controversies. 20 Once the cases before
him had been settled, Judge Lord, while acting in his judicial capacity,
lacked constitutional authority to give advice on the conduct of other Dalkon
Shield litigation.
There are, of course, deviations from the strict case or controversy rule.
When judges pen their decisions, they are undoubtedly influenced by the

16. S. ENGELMAYER & R.
17. Id.

WAGMAN,

supra note 4, at 259.

18. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1968).
19. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
20. U.S. CONST. art. III.

FEDERAL COURTS

§ 12, at 57-59 (4th ed. 1983).
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knowledge that their opinions may be used to decide later cases under the
doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, some appellate courts plainly recognize
their duty to indicate what the law is and publish only those opinions which
may provide such guidance. 2 These courts generally explain their decisions
in published opinions at much greater length than in unpublished opinions.
The clear implication is that some judges take special pains to educate
lawyers other than those representing the parties in the case. If judges did
no more than decide disputes before them, this expanded treatment would
22
be unnecessary.
Perhaps Judge Lord felt he had to protect the interests of the plaintiffs
in the other Dalkon Shield cases because Robins's agreement to settle was
obviously made in light of its interests in other cases. But that justification
is unsatisfactory. It appears that the only aid Judge Lord intended to provide
other plaintiffs was to try to persuade the Robins officials to settle their
cases. The need for a lecture does not justify an exception to the constitutionally-mandated case or controversy rule. Even assuming that it was necessary to deliver his message, Judge Lord could have accomplished that end
by expressing his views to the Robins officials and their counsel privately or
in writing, as he initially did. He overstepped his judicial bounds when he
exposed Robins to public scolding. Moreover, many of the other Dalkon
Shield plaintiffs had already retained counsel. In our adversary system, it is
for counsel to assert a client's rights, not a judge. Were the other plaintiffs'
interests implicated, they could have sought to intervene before the cases
heard by Judge Lord were settled. 23 Indeed, if Judge Lord felt that the rights
of persons not parties to the cases ' before him were involved, he could have
asked these non-parties to intervene and assert their own interests. That
would have provided the plaintiffs with greater protection without exposing
Judge Lord to criticism for acting improperly.
The authors conclude that Judge Lord was not successful in his attempt
to persuade the Robins officials to treat the Dalkon Shield cases more
sympathetically. It is likely, however, that Judge Lord had another goal in

21. See Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and
No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978)
(federal courts have promulgated rules designed to reduce the time spent on preparing opinions
by limiting the number of decisions that are published and by forbidding the citation of
unpublished opinions); Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24
HASTINos L.J. 37 (1972) (dramatic curtailment in publication of California appellate court
opinions is direct result of California Supreme Court's adoption of Rule 976 of California
Rules of Court, which limits types of opinions that may be published).
22. Similarly, federal courts may hear moot cases when the question presented is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The classic
example is a case involving the termination of pregnancy, because appellate review is rarely
possible within the normal gestation period. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 125 (1973). Courts
recognize such an exception because such cases might otherwise be insulated from appellate
review.
23. FED. R. Cxv. P. 24.
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mind-that of punishing the Robins officials. The authors make much of
Judge Lord's belief that corporate officials often escape punishment for
engaging in acts which ultimately cause severe injuries. Certainly, Judge
Lord's speech was reminiscent of that given by a judge when sentencing a
criminal. If punishment was Judge Lord's goal, his tongue-lashing was
improper. Righteous anger does not warrant a departure from the case or
controversy requirement. When Judge Lord uttered his remarks on the bench,
and on the record, he cloaked his views with the authority of a federal
court. For this reason, the Eighth Circuit acted properly in expunging Judge
Lord's words from the record of the settlement conference.
It is difficult to resist the book's conclusion that Robins's lawyers often
acted improperly, or at least out of improper motives. Nevertheless, that
conclusion would be more compelling if the authors had presented Robins's
side of the story. Admittedly, the authors were hampered in any attempt to
do so by the refusal of Robins and its lead counsel to speak to them.
However, Engelmayer and Wagman present a decidedly one-sided account.
They present Robins as so evil that it is surprising to learn that as of August,
1985, some two months after Lord's Justice went to press, Robins had won
twenty-seven, or nearly half, of the sixty Dalkon Shield cases that had gone
24
to judgment.
The authors' bias is most apparent in the handling of the Eighth Circuit's
review of Judge Lord's remarks. To be sure, the authors do not disguise
their feelings. Writing of Judge Lord's diatribe against Robins at the settlement hearing, they state that he was "doing what had to be done and saying
what had to be said." 25 However, the authors do not tell the full story of
the Eighth Circuit opinion. To the contrary, the authors quote only a single
phrase criticizing Judge Lord's behavior: that his remarks had "crossed the
line separating permissible judicial comments from impermissible public
accusation." 2 6 The Eighth Circuit was much more critical of Judge Lord
than that passage would lead readers to believe. In a part of the opinion
not referred to in the book, the Eighth Circuit wrote of Judge Lord's
behavior, "Such intimidation of private citizens who are not parties to
proceedings before the district court is antithetical to our notions of fundamental fairness and the proper functioning of our judicial system. These
procedures constitute a clear violation of the three [Robins's] officers' due
process rights." '27 Nor do the authors report that the Eighth Circuit called
Judge Lord's comments "highly injudicious." 28 These omissions make one
wonder what else the authors may have left out of their account.

24. Spragins & Glaberson, Searle: Staring at Some Long Days in Court, Bus. WK., Feb.
17, 1986, at 35.
25. S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, supra note 4, at 272.
26. Id. at 286.
27. Gardiner v. A. H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1191 (8th Cir. 1984).
28. Id. at 1192.
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The book contains other omissions. While it mentions that the Dalkon
Shield cases were once consolidated before a single judge for purposes of
discovery, it does not fully discuss what that judge did. In light of the
authors' approval of Judge Lord's re-opening of the discovery process, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the authors feel that the original judge
erred in his supervision of discovery. However, the authors do not explain
in what way the judge erred. One could also question the authors' failure
to discuss more completely the Dalkon Shield cases that were not before
Judge Lord. Nevertheless, the book sets out an important indictment of civil
procedure which would serve well as a teaching device for students of
procedure. The book is a case study of what not to do and of how to
respond to intransigent adversaries. This book tells an important story.
Although it presents only one viewpoint, it deserves to be read.

